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HOW SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF
OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY
FACILITATE TAX EVASION AND MODERN
POLICY RESPONSES TO THESE PROBLEMS
CARL PACINI* & NATE WADLINGER**
The purpose of this article is to review the use and application of shell
entities, as they facilitate tax evasion, impede investigations, and harm society.
This article details the types and characteristics of shell entities, reviews actual
cases to exhibit how shells are abused, outlines reasons shells disguise
beneficial ownership, and analyzes steps taken by countries and organizations
to thwart the abuse of shell entities. Many types of shell entities are used by
tax evaders and are often layered in an intricate network which conceals the
identity of beneficial owners. Nominees and bearer shares are used in tandem
with shell entities to optimize concealment. Accountants, lawyers, and trust
and company service providers facilitate and promote the use and abuse of
shell entities by tax fraudsters. The analysis makes clear the reasons for and
means by which tax evaders conceal trillions of dollars of income and wealth
that remain untaxed and may be used for nefarious purposes. The findings
demonstrate that shell entities used to conceal income and wealth prevent
untold trillions in taxes from being collected by governments worldwide. This
lack of revenue facilitates income inequality and skews national economic and
fiscal policies. The G-8, Financial Action Task Force, and G-20 have begun
steps to improve ownership transparency, but the effort is moving at a modest
pace. There is a need for more concerted action by national governments,
organizations, the United Nations, and law enforcement to improve ownership
transparency and information exchange regarding shell entities.
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So many wealthy Americans and persons from other countries evade taxes
using offshore and onshore accounts that law enforcement cannot control the
growing misconduct.1 The IRS estimates that tax evasion costs the federal
government on average $458 billion per year in lost revenues. 2 Tax cheats
evade taxes and hide illegally obtained assets and illicit activities by availing
themselves of the secrecy provided by legal domestic and offshore business
VWUXFWXUHV FRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV ³VKHOO HQWLWLHV´ In 2011, a World Bank
Study found that 70% of 213 large-scale corruption cases relied on the secrecy
of shell entities to hide the identity of the beneficial owners.3 The legal
structures of such entities typically include domestic and offshore limited
liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), international
1. David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at C1.
2. Chris Matthews, Here’s How Much Tax Cheats Cost the U.S. Government a Year, FORTUNE
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/29/tax-evasion-cost/ [https://perma.cc/XXX4-TCYX].
3. GLOBAL WITNESS, POVERTY, CORRUPTION AND ANONYMOUS COMPANIES: HOW HIDDEN
COMPANY OWNERSHIP FUELS CORRUPTION AND HINDERS THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 2 (Mar.
2014), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-global-witness-briefing
[https://perma.cc/2B5V-J6AR].
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business companies (IBCs), private foundations, company foundations, and
asset protection trusts. Regardless of the entity type, the identities of the
EHQHILFLDORZQHUVDUHKLGGHQEHKLQGWKHVHFUHF\RI³ILQDQFLDOVKHOOV´4
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines a beneficial RZQHUDV³WKH
natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural
person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted´5 This definition is
YHU\EURDGDQGDOVRLQFRUSRUDWHV³WKRVHSHUVRQVZKRexercise ultimate effective
FRQWURORYHUDOHJDOSHUVRQRUDUUDQJHPHQW´6 A beneficial owner is always a
natural person; a legal person cannot be a beneficial owner.7 Ultimate control
is by a natural person to allow that individual to benefit from the asset
involved.8
Obscured beneficial ownership via shell entities impedes law enforcement
and forensic accountants in tracking the movements of money and investigating
and recovering stolen assets and untaxed income.9 This is true for a wide range
of investigations that relate to domestic and foreign tax evaders.10
$ ³VKHOO FRPSDQ\´ UHIHUV WR DQ //& RU RWKHU EXVLQHVV HQWLW\ ZLWK QR
significant assets or ongoing business activities, and which is capable of
moving assets and large sums of money globally.11 Shell companies typically
have no presence other than a mailing address, have no employees, and produce
little or no independent economic value.12 It is not uncommon to find
hundreds, if not thousands, of shell entities registered to the same address

4. Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman, Funding Terror, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492 (2014).
5. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 8
(Oct.
2014),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparencybeneficial-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PSH-M2D4].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON, JI WON
PARK & J.C. SHARMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL STRUCTURES TO
HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 19 (2011).
9. Dean Kalant, Who’s in Charge Here? Requiring More Transparency in Corporate America:
Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049,
1052±54 (2009).
10. Adam Szubin, A Dangerous Shell Game, THE HILL (July 11, 2016, 5:48 PM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/287291-a-dangerous-shell-game [https://perma.cc/AU7G-QV8U].
11. FIN. CRIMES ENF¶T NETWORK (FINCEN), U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 4 (2006).
12. Id.
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because most shells have no operations.13 They are sometimes formed with a
JHQHULF VWDWHG SXUSRVH VXFK DV ³WR FRQGXFW OHJLWLPDWH WUDQVDFWLRQV VXFK DV
domestic and cross-border currency and asset transfers, or to facilitate corporate
mergers and reorganizationV´14
Shell entities are not always formed for illegal purposes, and they are even
a valuable source of tax revenues in some countries. For example, shell entities
in the Netherlands are involved in about $1 trillion in transactions each year
with the taxes paid on these transactions serving as an important government
revenue source.15 Shell entities can be publicly traded or privately owned.
Privately owned shell entities tend to be more susceptible to tax evasion
because limited ownership limits public exposure and eases the cloaking of
beneficial ownership.16 For this reason, privately owned shell entities have
become the financial and deception vehicles of choice for tax evaders.17
$UHFHQWOHDNRIGRFXPHQWVNQRZQDVWKH³3DUDGLVH3DSHUV´VLPLODUWo the
³3DQDPD3DSHUV´SDUWO\LOOXPLQDWHGWKHH[WHQWRIWKHYDVWPXUN\ZRUOGRIVKHOO
entities.18 The Paradise Papers contained 13.4 million leaked documents mostly

13. One building in the Grand Caymans known as Ugland House is officially the registered home
of 18,000 companies. The Missing $20 Trillion, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, at 13. Another
address of interest is P.O. Box 3444, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands. A Google search of
this address yields more than 600,000 hits. Ryan C. Hubbs, Shell Games: Investigating Shell
Companies and Understanding Their Roles in International Fraud, FRAUD MAG., July/Aug., 2014,
http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294983054 [https://perma.cc/2XVS-ZBCZ]. In
Delaware, 285,000 companies are registered in just one building. Oxfam & Richard Teather, Tax
Haven or Tax Hell?, INT¶L. TAX REV. June 2016, at 23.
14. FINCEN, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Gregory Crouch, Shaken Trust: The Netherlands Rethinks an Offshore Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2004, at C1, C15.
16. FINCEN, supra note 11, at 4.
17. Hubbs, supra note 13.
18. Mike Murphy, Paradise Papers: 6 Things to Know About Report Exposing Tax Havens of
the
Mega-Rich,
MARKETWATCH
(Nov.
6,
2017,
2:42
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/paradise-papers-6-things-to-know-about-report-exposing-taxhavens-of-the-mega-rich-2017-11-05 [https://perma.cc/6XHF-ABW6]. As a result of the Panama
Papers leak, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) executed three search warrants on February 14, 2018,
during an offshore tax evasion criminal investigation. Canada Revenue Agency, Canada Revenue
Agency Conducts Panama Papers Related Searches in Multiple Locations, GOV¶T OF CANADA (Feb.
14,
2018),
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/news/newsroom/criminal-investigationsactions-charges-convictions/20180214-canada-revenue-agency-conducts-panama-papers-relatedsearches-multiple-locations.html [https://perma.cc/34A5-2NGF]7KH&5$¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQLGHQWLILHG
a series of transactions involving foreign perpetrators and several transfers through offshore bank
accounts allegedly used to evade taxes. Id. ³7KLVLQYHVWLJDWLRQLVRQHRILQWHUQDWLRQDORIIVKRUHWD[
evasion cases that CRA is presently investigating which involve complex structures and potentially
multi-PLOOLRQGROODUVLQWD[HVHYDGHG´Id.
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from the Bermuda-based law firm Appleby and Singapore-based Asiaciti
Trust.19 The Papers detail the ways politicians, celebrities, and the ultra-rich
³protect their cash from taxes, hide ownership of major assets and conduct
business in secret.´20 Most of the exposed practices are legal, but some may be
unethical.21 For example, ³Stephen Bronfman, a top aide and key fundraiser of
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, was found to have avoided millions
in taxes through offshore accounts.´22 Although the conduct was not illegal, it
was very embarrassing for Trudeau, who had pledged to crackdown on tax
havens.23
While there is a significant literature in law, accounting, and economics that
examines tax evasion,24 there is scant information on how shell entities actually
facilitate tax evasion. The extensive abuse and illegitimate use of domestic and
offshore entities to evade taxes make such entities an important aspect of the
work of forensic accountants, law enforcement, auditors, and regulators.
Hence, the purpose of this article is to analyze the use and application of shell
entities and lack of ownership transparency as they facilitate tax evasion,
impede investigations, and harm societies.
The first section below discusses the importance of secrecy or concealment
and then analyzes the use and abuse of shell entities to achieve such secrecy
(often for illegal purposes). The second section analyzes different types of legal
or business structures that are and have been used as shell entities. The first
two sections are intended to provide the reader historical context about shell
entities. The third section discusses the suggested reasons for the vulnerability
of various business structures that, when privately owned, are easily
manipulated to operate as shell entities. Lack of ownership transparency is
covered to varying degrees in the first three sections. The fourth section
highlights policy reactions and responses, including legislation, dealing with
beneficial ownership problems, the use and abuse of various shell entities, and
the ability of forensic accountants and law enforcement to combat and reduce
tax evasion. The final section concludes the paper.

19. Murphy, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOV¶TAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND
SECRECY (2006); Jeffrey Simser, Tax Evasion and Avoidance Typologies, 11 J. MONEY LAUNDERING
CONTROL 123 (2008).
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I. EVADERS ENJOY CONCEALMENT AND SECRECY
A correlation exists between corruption and anonymous shell entities.
Tracing illicit funds or assets and tax evasion to a shell entity is not that useful
if the individuals who control it (i.e., beneficial owners) cannot be identified.25
International standards on beneficial owners have been tightened in recent years
but remain quite loose.26 Practice varies substantially, with some offshore
financial centers having had ownership registries for years; while in the United
States, corporate formation agents and trust and company service providers
(TCSPs) are not licensed and beneficial ownership information is not collected
and verified.27
By necessity, tax evaders are attracted to jurisdictions with liberal financial
secrecy laws and practices. Such jurisdictions facilitate secrecy and thereby
provide relatively weak barriers to the abuse of domestic and offshore shell
entities, trusts, foundations, shelf corporations, IBCs, LLCs, and other business
structures.28 In 2009, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) launched an online
database that shows how the legal, judicial, and regulatory details of different
jurisdictions contribute to the environment of financial secrecy.29 A global
ranking of financial secrecy, called the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), draws
attention to the various aspects of financial secrecy.30 According to the TJN,
an estimated $21 trillion to $32 trillion of private financial wealth is located in
secrecy jurisdictions around the world.31 Secrecy jurisdictions use concealment
and anti-disclosure laws to attract illicit and illegitimate financial flows.32 Illicit
cross-border financial flows have been estimated at $1±$1.6 trillion per year.33
Offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) alone had assets in
excess of $1.5 trillion in early 2017.34
The FSI indicates that traditional stereotypes of tax havens and secrecy are
inaccurate. 7KH ZRUOG¶V PRVW VLJQLILFant providers of financial secrecy, the
25. See Szubin, supra note 10.
26. Id.
27. John Christensen, The Hidden Trillions: Secrecy, Corruption, and the Offshore Interface, 57
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 335 (2012).
28. Id. at 326.
29. Id. at 329.
30. Id.
JUST.
NETWORK
(Jan.
30,
2018),
31. Financial
Secrecy
Index,
TAX
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com [https://perma.cc/5LT3-BYLN].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Vanessa Houlder, Offshore Assets Held in British Virgin Islands Double Over 7 Years to
$1.5tn, FIN. TIMES (London), June 21, 2017, at 1.
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places that harbor the most concealed assets, are mostly not small palm-fringed
islands but rather Switzerland, the United States, Singapore, Luxembourg, and
Germany.35 In 2017, the United States ranked second in terms of providing
financial secrecy.36
II. ENTITIES USED TO FACILITATE EVASION
Tax evaders and others can use shell entities to commit tax evasion and
often, the related offense of money laundering.37 The cleverest schemes
insulate the tax evader through many layers of shell entities, such as a trust,
LLC, and others. Such schemes also incorporate misdirection by creating the
appearance that the wrongdoer has no control of the shell entity, and that those
in control of the entity are in an offshore jurisdiction.38
One example of how a tax evader layered offshore asset protection trusts
(OAPTs)39 is United States v. Scott.40 An organization named International
Business Associates (IBA) devised a scheme involving transfers to and among
four successive trusts.41 Trust I was a domestic trust established ³as a shell with
an apparently fictitious contribution of $100 by some entity other than´ the
client.42 Trust I was required to distribute all taxable income to Trust II (a

35. Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 31.
36. Lynnley Browning, Report Says U.S. is World’s Second-Biggest Tax Haven, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 30, 2018, 11:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-30/u-s-seen-as-worlds-second-biggest-tax-haven-after-switzerland [https://perma.cc/73GL-SW9P].
37. Although tax evasion and money laundering are separate and distinct offenses, there is a
distinct similarity between the methods used for money laundering and tax evasion. Bryan S. Arce,
Taken to the Cleaners: Panama’s Financial Secrecy Laws Facilitate the Laundering of Evaded U.S.
Taxes, 34 BROOK. J. INT¶L. L. 465, 465±66, 471 (2009). Both require deception (or an act of fraud)
and concealment, and when assets from illegal activity are shielded from tax officials, a direct overlap
occurs between the two. Id. at 471. Once money evades taxes, it must be laundered before it can be
used again. Id.
38. Id. at 471±72.
39. An offshore asset protection trust (OAPT) is a type of spendthrift trust that is established in
a nation or jurisdiction outside the U.S. Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A
Prudent Financial Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 149,
152 (2007). Unlike most U.S. MXULVGLFWLRQVQXPHURXVRIIVKRUHMXULVGLFWLRQV³UHFRJQL]HµVHOI-VHWWOHG¶
spendthrift trusts, that is, trusts . . . GHVLJQHGWRSURWHFWWKHVHWWORU´IURPGRPHVWLFFUHGLWRUV¶FODLPVId.
Various jurisdictions that permit OAPTs are Anguilla, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the BVI, the
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, Saint Kitts-Nevis, and the Turks
and Caicos Islands. Id. at 152; Trent Maxwell, Comment, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A Threat
to Child Support?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 477, 482.
40. 37 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 1570.
42. Id.
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Belizean trust).43 Trust ,,¶VWUXVWHHZDVDUHVLGHQWRI%HOL]HDQGUHTXLUHGWRILOH
a U.S. tax return.44 Trust II was a conduit trust that passed its income to Trust
III, an alleged foreign trust that could distribute and accumulate income.45 Trust
IV was a passive foreign trust until the purchaser of the trust needed funds.46
Like most OAPT tax evasion schemes, power rested with the purchaser-client
while the true beneficial owner remained unnamed in all documentation.47
Such abuses are compounded by states, provinces, and countries that permit
shell entities to own and manage other shell entities.48 The result can be
multiple layers of cloaked ownership that make it virtually impossible for
forensic accountants and tax officials to determine the identity of beneficial
owners.
A. LLCs as Shells
Because LLCs may be owned and managed anonymously, they can be
subject to abuse. Ownership transparency requirements vary from state-to-state
and country-to-country.49 LLCs provide members (rather than shareholders)
the same limited liability afforded to corporate shareholders while at the same
WLPHSURYLGLQJWKH³SDVVWKURXJK´WD[DWLRQEHQHILWVWRPHPEHUV50 When used
as shell entities, LLCs exist only to hold or own other entities or bank accounts,
or as simply as a transfer point for moving funds from one account or business
to another.
$Q//&VKHOOHQWLW\¶VRZQHUVKLS³can be structured in a variety of forms,
including having shares µissued to a natural or legal person or in registered or
bearer from.¶´51 Bearer shares (not permitted in the United States) confer rights
of ownership to a company upon the physical holder or possessor of the
shares.52 They are commonly and legitimately used in a number of countries.53
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1571.
See FINCEN, supra note 11, at 10.
See U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-06-376, COMPANY FORMATIONS:
MINIMAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IS COLLECTED AND AVAILABLE 41±42 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06376.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZC2-J6CR].
50. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 160.
51. Max Biedermann, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 BYU INT¶L L. & MGT. REV.
72, 75±76 (2015) (quoting FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE
VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 1 (2006)).
52. Id. at 76.
53. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 41, 43±44.
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However, given that bearer shares are not registered as to ownership, they
enable the commission of tax evasion and can be controlled by beneficial
owners who may be unidentifiable.54
LLCs are easy to form (in as little as two hours for about $100±$200 in
some states)55 and can be linked or layered across different jurisdictions,
creating a confusing path for forensic accountants, auditors, and tax
investigators.56 If they are established in a jurisdiction that has no regard for
ownership transparency (e.g., Wyoming, Nevada, Delaware, Cayman Islands),
then identifying the beneficial owners may become virtually impossible.57 The
United States LVRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VIRUHPRVWMXULVGLFWLRQVIRUWKRVHVHHNLQJWR
avoid ownership transparency. In fact, U.S. LLC shells are used more often in
laundering the proceeds of grand corruption, which often escape taxation, than
the LLC shells of any other country.58
A fine example of the abuse of LLC shells for tax evasion occurred in
United States v. Stegman.59 In September 1997, Kathleen Stegman formed a
Kansas corporation called Midwest Medical Aesthetics Center, Inc.60 In
January 1998, a certificate of amendment was filed to show an entity name
change to Midwest Medical Aesthetics Center, P.A. (Midwest).61 Stegman
established several LLCs, including Samson, LLC. Stegman used the LLCs to
launder Midwest client payments.62 She used the LLCs to buy money orders
that she, in turn, used to purchase items for personal use.63 From 2007 to 2009,
Stegman purchased $272,748 in money orders yet she reported zero cash
income on her federal income tax returns.64 In October 2010, an IRS criminal
investigation report ³noted that Midwest took in large amounts of cash, yet
made no deposits in 2007 or 2008,´ and ³QRWHG StegmaQ¶V µlavish¶ lifestyle,
which included frequent travel´ and large asset purchases of about $2,000,000
54. Id. at 41, 44.
55. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 76.
56. Idelys Martinez, Comment, The Shell Game: An Easy Hide-and-Go-Seek Game for
Criminals Around the World, 29 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 185, 196±97 (2017).
57. See generally JAY D. ADKISSON & CHRISTOPHER M. RISER, ASSET PROTECTION: CONCEPTS
AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING YOUR WEALTH (2004).
58. Jason Sharman, Shell Companies and Asset Recovery: Piercing the Corporate Veil, in
EMERGING TRENDS IN ASSET RECOVERY 67, 68 (Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Charles Monteith &
Pedro Gomes Pereira eds., 2013).
59. 873 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2017).
60. Id. at 1219.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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(mostly real estate).65 Stegman also engaged in obstructive conduct as she
DOWHUHG0LGZHVW¶VJHQHUDOOHGJHUVDQGGLUHFWHGHPSOR\HHVWRGHVWUR\EXVLQHVV
records.66 Stegman was convicted of tax evasion and other charges and
sentenced to fifty-one months in prison.67 Other cases also demonstrate how
LLCs are abused to commit tax evasion.68
B. Shelf Corporations
Existing but unused shell companies may be converted to current, possibly
illegal, use. Such companies are known as shelf or aged corporations.69 The
established age of these companies adds to their credibility.70 Their
attractiveness includes instant availability, immediate ownership due to any
legal filing requirements having already been satisfied, and no shares having
yet been offered.71 In general, domestic and offshore shelf corporations possess
all the necessary prerequisites in the appropriate jurisdiction (e.g., Wyoming,

65. Id. at 1220.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1221.
68. In Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, James Kelley Williams, a successful
Mississippi businessman, expected to realize an $18 million capital gain in tax year 2001 from the
cancellation of a loan he had guaranteed. 720 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 2013). Williams entered into a
long-term investment program offered by Bricolage Capital, LLC. Id. at 599±600. Bricolage enlisted
Credit Suisse-%RVWRQ DV WKH EDQN LQWHJUDO WR :LOOLDPV¶ SURJUDP DQG XVHG //&V DV SDUWQHUVKLSV WR
execute foreign exchange and other transactions that generate tax losses. Id.
%ULFRODJH¶VSODQHQWDLOHGD three-tier investment strategy. Id. at 600. The first tier involved establishing
an LLC with a transitory partner/manager to act as a holding company for other funds. Id. “The firsttier LLC would own 99% of a second LLC, which would own 99% of a third //&´Id. “The two
lower-WLHUHG//&VZRXOGHQJDJHLQWUDQVDFWLRQVWKDWZRXOG>\LHOG@WKHGHVLUHGWD[ORVV´Id. ³7KHWKLUG
tier LLC would enter into sets of currency forward contracts . . . that would [yield] offsetting gains and
ORVVHV´Id. At a certain point, the investor-FOLHQWZRXOGEX\WKHWUDQVLWRU\SDUWQHUPDQDJHU¶VLQWHUHVW
LQWKH//&V³7KHVHFRQG-WLHU//&ZRXOGWKHQREWDLQD&UHGLW6XLVVHORDQJXDUDQWHHGE\WKHLQYHVWRU´
(Williams). Id. ³7KHLQYHVWRU¶VJXDUDQWHHRIWKHORDQZRXOGJLYH>:LOOLams] enough basis in the LLCs
to take advantage of the embedded loss[es] . . . JHQHUDWHG´Id.
The three domestic LLCs were Nevada Partners, Carson Partners, and Reno Partners. Id. at 601.
Williams made his required investments in the LLCs using the JKW 1991 Revocable Trust, which held
most of his wealth. Id. at 602. Numerous purchases of LLCs and other interests occurred to transfer
the necessary tax losses to Williams, which he claimed on his 2001 tax return. Id.
7KH)LIWK&LUFXLWDIILUPHGWKHIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWKDW WKH³WUDQVDFWLRQVODFNed economic
VXEVWDQFHDQGPXVWEHGLVUHJDUGHGIRUWD[SXUSRVHV´DQG WKHQHJOLJHQFHSHQDOW\DSSOLHGDQGWKH
three domestic LLCs were not entitled to the reasonable cause defense. Id. at 619.
69. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37.
70. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 77.
71. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37±38.

2018]

SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY

121

Nevada, St. Kitts-Nevis) for legal operation and quick transfer of ownership.72 
Shelf corporations may be purchased on the internet for a few thousand dollars
from
TCSPs
such
as
https://www.offshorecompany.com
and
73
https://www.companiesinc.com. In some cases, shelf entities can even be
bought with ready-made, established bank accounts.74
Once a shelf company is bought, the buyer may acquire the shelf
FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V HVWDEOLVKHG FUHGLW DQG WD[ KLVWRU\ ZKLFK IXUWKHU HQKDQFHV LWV
credibility.75 The lack of accurate and recorded information about shelf entities
can create almost insurmountable obstacles for auditors, forensic accountants,
IRS investigators, and regulators in any attempt to identify the beneficial
owner(s).76
C. Using Nominees or Nominee Directors in Shell Entities
Another legal device or approach to optimize concealment is for the shell
HQWLW\¶VEHQHILFLDORZQHURURZQHUVWRHOHFWWRKLUHDQRPLQHHDVDFRPSDQ\
director. A nominee is one who holds bare legal title for another, or is
designated to act in place of another in a limited way, ³or who receives and
distributes funds for the benefit of others.´77 A nominee can be a relative,
friend, trusted associate, or a person who has no link to the true beneficial
Nominee
incorporation
services
owner(s).78
(http://www.offshoresimple.com/nominee/htm) provide local (related to the
jurisdiction of the shell entity) or third-party nominees who will be the director
or manager of the shell firm.79 The nominee typically signs a general power of
attorney which gives the beneficial owner(s) full power to manage the shell

72. Debra Cassens Weiss, Wyoming Home is a ‘Little Cayman Island’ for Shell Companies,
ABA
J.
(June
28,
2011,
4:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wyoming_home_is_a_little_cayman_island_for_shell_comp
anies [https://perma.cc/DXY2-ZMZ3].
73. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 38; FINCEN, supra note 11, at 5±6.
74. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 38; FINCEN, supra note 11, at 6.
75. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37±38.
76. Id. at 38±39.
77. Martinez, supra note 56, at 197 n.57; see also LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 119
(2d Cir. 1997).
78. See LiButti, 107 F.3d at 119; Anonymous Companies, GLOB. FIN. INTEGRITY,
https://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/anonymous-companies [https://perma.cc/BVK4-FGFD] (last visited
Aug. 18, 2018).
79. Martinez, supra note 56, at 197 n.58.
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entity.80 The nominee also provides a signed and undated letter of resignation
to further protect the anonymity of the beneficial owner(s).81
A mere twenty-eight nominee directors have established or are in control
of more than 21,000 companies.82 And many of these individuals have been
identified as being involved with criminal organizations and individuals.83
They market their services by selling their names and addresses in obscure
global locations.84 The shell entities themselves are ³often registered
anonymously . . . in the British Virgin Islands, but also in Ireland, New
Zealand, Belize and the UK itself.´85 In early 2014, the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (over 190 journalists from 65
countries) published a database of the incorporation records of shell companies,
directors (some nominees), and addresses that was leaked to them.86 The
database shows the extent of shell company networks and how many companies
and nominee directors are linked together.87
D. Trusts
Trusts are another vehicle subject to abuse by tax evaders, fraudsters, and
other criminals. The salient characteristic of a trust is that it provides for a
separation of legal and beneficial ownership.88 Legal control is granted to a
trustee by a settlor (a.k.a., a creator or grantor), who manages the trust asset(s)
according to the terms of a trust agreement for the benefit of beneficiaries.89 A
settlor, creator, or grantor, who establishes the trust, can minimize the transfer,

80. ADKISSON & RISER, supra note 57, at 201; Nominee Service–Officers, Directors and
Managers,
COS.
INC.,
https://companiesinc.com/grow-your-business-/nominee-service
[https://perma.cc/K25K-YYAL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2018); Nominee Services, GWS GRP.,
https://gws-offshore.com/nominee-services [https://perma.cc/PC2Y-HY7A] (last visited Mar. 23,
2018).
81. ADKISSON & RISER, supra note 57; Nominee Service–Officers, Directors and Managers,
supra note 80; Nominee Services, supra note 80.
82. James Ball, Offshore Secrets: How Many Companies Do ‘Sham Directors’ Control?, THE
GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/datablog/2012/nov/26/offshore-secrets-companiessham-directors [https://perma.cc/DF5K-86JN] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Int¶l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, About, OFFSHORE LEAKS DATABASE,
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/pages/about [https://perma.cc/763U-E2K9] (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).
87. Id.
88. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
287, 290 (2002).
89. Id.
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DOLHQDWLRQ RU DWWDFKPHQW RI D EHQHILFLDU\¶V WUXVW LQWHUHVW E\ FUHDWLQJ D
spendthrift trust (also called an asset protection trust) or including a spendthrift
provision in the trust.90 One bright line rule employed by courts in some
jurisdictions, especially in the majority of U.S. states, is that any self-settled
trust (one in which the creator or grantor is also a beneficiary), regardless of
whether it includes a so-called spendthrift provision, cannot be a spendthrift
trust.91 Although virtually all states recognize spendthrift provisions, most do
not permit a settlor who is also a beneficiary to protect his or her assets from
FUHGLWRUV¶FODLPV HVSHFLDOO\WKRVHLQYROYLQJFKLOGVXSSRUWDOLPRQ\DQGFHUWDLQ
other claims).92 7KLVLVEHFDXVHVSHQGWKULIWWUXVWVDUHQHFHVVDULO\³FUHDWHGZLWK
DYLHZRISURYLGLQJDIXQGIRUWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIDQRWKHU´QRWIRUWKHVHWWORU¶V
own benefit.93
In many jurisdictions (onshore and offshore), a spendthrift trust may be
implemented by including a spendthrift clause or provision in the trust
instrument.94 Self-settled spendthrift trusts, which have been given the
PLVQRPHURI³DVVHWSURWHFWLRQWUXVWV´DUHD³ERRPLQJEXVLQHVVIRUEDQNVWUXVW
companies, and estate planners, both [in the United States] and abroad. They
[are] a multi-billion-dollar-a-\HDU EXVLQHVV´95 Many U.S. and offshore
promoters attract U.S., Canadian, and other citizens with promises of tax
avoidance (which in some cases is evasion) and asset protection through the use
of trusts.96 In this way, they are quite similar to the use of LLC shell
companies.97 In fact, an asset protection trust is a type of shell entity.
The popularity of asset protection trusts is based, in large part, on the fact
that trusts provide beneficiaries with more privacy and autonomy than do
traditional business entities. ³7UXVWV KDYH QR UHJLVWUDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV RU
FHQWUDOUHJLVWULHVZKHUHWUXVWHHVHWWORUDQGEHQHILFLDU\QDPHVPXVWEHOLVWHG´98
(YHQZKHUHEHQHILFLDULHV¶LGHQWLties must be disclosed, the beneficiary can be

90. See Miller v. Kresser, 34 So. 3d 172, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Croom v. Ocala
Plumbing & Elec. Co., 57 So. 243, 244 (Fla. 1911)).
91. In re Brown, 303 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002).
92. Ausness, supra note 39, at 150±51.
93. Brown, 303 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis omitted).
94. Nicole F. Stowell, Erik Johanson & Carl Pacini, The Use of Wills and Asset Protection Trusts
in Fraud and Other Financial Crimes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 509, 525 (2017).
95. Jeffrey A. Morse, Nevada Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts or Offshore Trusts?, NEV. LAW.,
Mar. 2008, at 16, 16.
96. Id.
97. Stowell, Johanson & Pacini, supra note 94, at 526; VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 168±70.
98. Stowell, Johanson & Pacini, supra note 94, at 527.
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a limited partnership, LLC, or another trust, and this ³add[s] layers of opacity
WRWKHWUXVW¶VRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH´99 If the trust is drafted by an attorney, the
attorney±client privilege erects an additional barrier to transparency. Due to
these secrecy features, trusts are very much subject to abuse.100
Offshore asset protection trusts (OAPTs) possess a number of features that
permit the settlor to exercise protective control over trust assets. Protective
features of an OAPT may include a trust protector clause, an anti-duress clause,
a flee or flight clause, and a non-binding letter of intent or wishes.101 A trust
SURWHFWRUFODXVHSURYLGHVIRUD³WUXVWSURWHFWRU´EHLQJDSSRLQWHGE\WKHJUDQWRU
to act as an advisor and who is responsible for making sure the trustee
LPSOHPHQWVWKHVHWWORU¶VZLVKHV102 An anti-duress clause prohibits the trustee
from complying with any order imposed upon the settlor or trustee.103 A flee
or flight clause authorizes the trustee to transfer the trust to another jurisdiction
upon the occurrence of certain events, such as an inquiry from a foreign
government or Interpol.104 A letter of intent or wishes is written by the settlor
and states his or her wishes as to the dissipation of trust assets.105 The control
offered the settlor by these features contribute to the abuse of OAPTs as a shell
entity to evade taxes.
OAPTs can be utilized in two ways by those bent on committing tax
evasion: 1) hiding legitimate interest-earning assets for the purpose of evading
taxes106 DQG LQWHJUDWLQJLOOLFLWO\REWDLQHGIXQGVLQWRDQHFRQRP\DV³FOHDQ
DVVHWV´ PRQH\ODXQGHULQJ 107 The linchpins to illegitimate uses or abuses of
OAPTs are layering and misdirection.108
Just as with other types of shell entities, the goal is to transfer incomeearning assets through enough layers of OAPTs and other shell entities so that
a banker, lawyer, forensic accountant, auditor, or IRS agent will not suspect or

99. Id. at 527±28.
100. See id. at 528; Ausness, supra note 39, at 154±55.
101. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102
COM. L.J. 138, 146±49 (1997).
102. Id. at 149.
103. Id. at 146; Harvey M. Silets & Michael C. Drew, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Tax
Planning or Tax Fraud?, 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 9, 10±11 (2001).
104. Ausness, supra note 39, at 156.
105. Id.; Lorenzetti, supra note 101, at 149.
106. Silets & Drew, supra note 103, at 9.
107. Id.; Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering
and Related Litigation Traps for the Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT¶L.
L. 1023, 1027 (1999).
108. Silets & Drew, supra note 103, at 9.
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discover the sources or beneficial owners of assets.109 By accomplishing this
goal, individuals and entities can control their income-earning assets and tax
liabilities without being named as a beneficiary or trustee.110 The privacy and
anonymity of OAPTs make them a superb means of evading taxes and
laundering assets and vulnerable to various forms of illegal and unethical abuse.
E. Limited Partnerships (LPs) and Family Limited Partnerships (FLPs)
LPs and FLPs are excellent places to hide income-earning assets and evade
taxes.111 In a typical scheme involving an LP, the tax evader (general partner)
provides trusted associates, friends, or family members income-earning assets
to invest in an LP.112 7KHVH³LQYHVWRUV´EHFRPHOLPLWHGSDUWQHUVZKRKDYHQR
personal legal liability for the debts of the business, including tax liabilities, and
cannot take an active role in operating the business.113 Another scheme
involving an LP occurs when the tax evader conveys income-earning assets to
an LP of which the tax fraudster is the sole limited partner and then transfers
the partnership interest to a trust of which the tax evader is the sole trustee and
beneficiary (usually done on an offshore basis).114
In an attempt to hide interest-earning assets or obscure the beneficial owner,
an FLP might be arranged in which a married couple contributes all of their
assets to the FLP. In this structure, each spouse retains a 1% general partnership
interest and a 49% limited partnership interest.115 General partners in an FLP
KDYH XQOLPLWHG SHUVRQDO OLDELOLW\ IRU WKH )/3¶V WD[ Gebts and other

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Asher Rubinstein, Efficacy of Family Limited Partnerships: A Case Study, GALLET
DREYER & BERKEY, LLP (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.gdblaw.com/efficacy-of-family-limitedpartnership [https://perma.cc/3BT7-G8J8]; David Cay Johnston, Ex-I.R.S. Agent Says Tax Evasion by
Real
Estate
Partners
is
Huge,
N.Y.
(Dec.
7,
2007),
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/business/07taxes.html [https://perma.cc/J83S-TZNZ].
112. Rubinstein, supra note 111; Johnston, supra note 111.
113. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL, supra note 8, at 161.
114. Howard Rosen & Patricia Donlevy-Rosen, Offshore Trust/Offshore LLC Combination:
Significant Improvement Over Partnership/Trust Structure, ASSET PROTECTION NEWS (DonlevyRosen & Rosen, P.A., Coral Gables, FL.), Apr./May 2001, https://protectyou.com/2001/04/offshoretrust-offshore-llc-combination-significant-improvement-over-partnership-trust-structure/
[https://perma.cc/WG6A-J2K8].
115. See generally Rebecca B. Hawblitzel, Case Note, A Change in Planning: Estate of Strangi
v. Commissioner’s Effect on the Use of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning, 57 ARK. L.
REV. 595 (2004).
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obligations.116 Using this arrangement subjects only 2% RIWKHFRXSOH¶VDVVHWV
to unlimited liability. In the United States, there have been some cases in which
a court has ruled WKDWDSDUWQHU¶VLQWHUHVWLQD FLP can be foreclosed upon by a
creditor.117
F. International Business Companies (IBCs)
An IBC is an offshore corporation closely related to the traditional
corporation since it employs articles of incorporation or association and
requires company directors.118 An IBC is an entity targeted at non-residents of
the jurisdiction in which the IBC is sited.119 It also may not engage in economic
activities within its situs jurisdiction.120 In most jurisdictions, an IBC is
governed by strict confidentiality regulations as the names of its shareholders
and directors need not be published in any public register.121 Also, although
shareholders of many IBCs are required to elect directors, once elected the
board may run the IBC with little recourse to shareholders.122 In some IBC
jurisdictions, the abolition of share capital allows the IBC to ignore capital
retention in making distributions to shareholders.123 The freedom in making or
not making distributions to shareholders makes the IBC a convenient vehicle
for tax evasion, money laundering, and moving money around to many different
locations to obscure the money trail for auditors, forensic accountants, and tax
investigators.
An IBC is a subcategory of LLCs that is used as a tool by corporations and
individuals throughout the world to direct profits away from high-tax countries
into offshore jurisdictions that have low or zero tax rates and tax treaties with
other nations (double tax treaties). For example, more than 140 listed
businesses in London, New York, and Hong Kong have a unit in the BVI which
is useful as a tax neutral hub.124

116. Kiara Ashanti, What is a Family Limited Partnership (FLP): Pros and Cons, MONEY
CRASHERS, https://www.moneycrashers.com/family-limited-partnership-flp [https://perma.cc/5KMZ7M24] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
117. See, e.g., Firmani v. Firmani, 752 A.2d 854, 855±56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(illustrating an unsuccessful scheme to hide assets using an FLP).
118. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL: USING
CORPORATE ENTITIES FOR ILLICIT PURPOSES 24 (2001).
119. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 266.
120. Id.
121. OECD, supra note 118, at 24.
122. Id.
123. Offshore: British Virgin Islands, THE LAWYER, June 13, 2005, at 26, 29.
124. Houlder, supra note 34, at 1.
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G. Private Interest Foundations (PIFs) and Company Foundations (CFs)
The PIF is a vehicle provided by civil law countries (now being adopted by
some common law countries) for tax management, estate planning purposes,
asset protection, and as an alternative to trusts.125 The PIF was first introduced
in Monaco in 1922 but has attracted followers such as Liechtenstein, Panama,
the Bahamas, Costa Rica, St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, and Antigua.126 Although
there is no single definition of a foundation, a number of common features can
be identified in jurisdictions that offer PIFs.
Panama is a good example since it has permitted PIFs since 1995,127 has
more than 400,000 registered offshore corporations and PIFs, does not require
foundations to keep financial records or submit tax returns, and offers much
secrecy.128 A PIF has four main parts:
1. Founder- the person or entity that forms the foundation in the public
registry. Usually a nominee founder is provided by a TCSP along with a presigned, undated letter of resignation.129 At that point, the nominee founder
holds no control. A founder is analogous to a trustee;
2. Foundation Council- serves the same function for a PIF as a board of
directors does for a corporation.130 7KHFRXQFLOV¶PHPEHUV¶QDPHVDQGSDVVSRUW
numbers are noted in the public registry when the foundation is established.131
Often a nominee council is provided along with pre-signed, undated letters of
resignation from the nominee council;132
3. Protector- the ultimate controller of the foundation. Immediately upon
establishment, the council appoints a protector through a notarized private
protectorate document.133 Since the document is a private, non-publicly

125. Dayra Berbey de Rojas, Panama: The Role of the Protector in the Private Interest
Foundation, 14 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 350, 350 (2008).
126. Harry Wiggin, Anguilla: Foundations and Trusts–A Comparison, 14 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
287, 287 (2008).
127. Id.
128. Adam Thomson, The Cost of Privacy: Tax and Trading in Panama, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30,
2010), https://www.ft.com/search?sort=relevance&q=the+cost+of+privacy+53A+tax+and+trading+i
n+panama+and+thomson [https://perma.cc/QP5C-XB9M].
129. Elements of a Panama Private Interest Foundation, PAN. OFFSHORE SERVS.,
http://www.panama-offshore-services.com/foundation_elements.htm [https://perma.cc/WLF3-VTL9]
(last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.

128

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:111

registered document, the protector remains anonymous.134 At that point, the
protector has full control over the foundation (which holds legal title to any
assets) and its assets;135 and
4. Beneficiaries- a PIF does not have owners, but rather beneficiaries.136
The latter are appointed by the protector either through a private letter of wishes
or through a formal set of by-laws.137 The contents of both remain confidential.
Privately appointed beneficiaries remain anonymous.138
In sum, no legal requirement exists to disclose the name of the founder,
beneficiaries, or protector. There is no filing of an annual tax return or financial
statement.139 A foundation may ³engage in any business or civil transaction in
any part of the world and in any currency.´140 Moreover, the foundation charter
may be signed by an attorney without disclosing the founder.141
In some foundation jurisdictions (e.g., Anguilla), any assets available for
distribution to a beneficiary ³are not capable of being alienated or passed by
bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, or liable to be seized, sold, attached, or
otherwise taken in execution, by process of law.´142 The secrecy or lack of
transparency and flexibility of PIFs have led to their spread throughout the
offshore world.143 Such foundations represent another vehicle that can be used
by tax evaders.
In the last quarter of 2017, the Cayman Islands implemented a new legal
structure known as a Company Foundation (CF) that could be used as a shell
entity.144 A CF shares some features with a trust but may be established so
beneficiaries are given no rights to make a claim against the CF.145 The CF law
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; Francesca Di Gregori Boschini, Private Foundations and Reserved Powers Trusts, TR.
& EST., Apr. 2006, at 46, 48.
138. Boschini, supra note 137, at 48±49; ASPEN GRP. LTD., A GUIDE TO PANAMANIAN PRIVATE
INTEREST
FOUNDATIONS
3
(2012),
http://www.aspenoffshore.com/files/docs/2012/11/a_guide_to_panamanian_private_interest_foundati
on_new_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB2V-QN66]; Elements of a Panama Private Interest Foundation,
supra note 129.
139. Boschini, supra note 137, at 48.
140. ASPEN GRP. LTD., supra note 138, at 4.
141. Id.
142. Wiggin, supra note 126, at 289.
143. Id. at 287, 290.
144. Ray Davern & Alex Way, Notes from a Small Island: Some Observations on the New
Cayman Islands Foundation Company, 23 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 916, 916 (2017).
145. Id. at 918.
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itself describes possible objects of a CF such as acting as a holding company or
an investment company.146 Another feature of a CF that trusts do not possess
is that any kind of power can be given to any person, whether as a personal
power, as a benefit for the CF, or for any other lawful purpose.147 These objects
and powers make the CF vulnerable to abuse by tax evaders. Only the passage
of time will indicate whether the CF will be added to the list of legal structures
that serve as shell entities for tax evasion.
III. THREE MAIN REASONS SHELL ENTITIES PROVIDE SECRECY AND DISGUISE
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TO FACILITATE TAX EVASION
Three main reasons explain the continued ability of tax evaders to use shell
entities to conceal the identity of their actual beneficial owners and to operate
in the shadows. One reason is the lack of transparency in most jurisdictions
(including U.S. states) with regard to actual or beneficial owners, directors,
corporate officers, members, partners, trustees, beneficiaries, and others. The
second reason is that tax evaders require the services of professionals such as
DFFRXQWDQWVODZ\HUVILQDQFLDODGYLVRUVDQG7&63VRU³JDWHNHHSHUV´WRFUHDWH
shell entities, layer or pyramid entities together into complicated webs of
anonymous entities, hide assets, evade taxes, and launder funds. The third
reason is that the layering or pyramiding of different shell entities (often
different legal structures) in various jurisdictions around the globe makes an
impenetrable trail for tax investigators and forensic accountants to follow.
A. Lack of Beneficial Ownership Transparency
Ownership transparency refers to disclosing majority and minority
shareholders, members, beneficiaries, protectors, trustees, founders, and
directors, depending upon the type of legal entity, or any other natural person
who is in a position to control and benefit from an asset.148 Transparency also
includes knowledge of the controlling structure of other legal entities.
³Knowledge of beneficial owners and the control structures of [entities] must
then be accompanied by effective investigation and enforcement mechanisms
regarding disclosed information.´149
146. A New Vehicle for the Cayman Trusts Industry: The Foundation Company, MAPLES (Feb.
15, 2017), https://www.maplesandcalder.com/news/article/a-new-vehicle-for-the-cayman-trustsindustry-the-foundation-company-1434/ [https://perma.cc/37VC-28P3].
147. Davern & Way, supra note 144, at 919.
148. Avnita Lakhani, Imposing Company Ownership Transparency Requirements:
Opportunities for Effective Governance of Equity Capital Markets or Constraints on Corporate
Performance, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INT¶L. & COMP. L. 122, 128±29 (2016).
149. Id. at 129.
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The issue of transparency is captured by FATF Recommendation 24, which
states that ³countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate, and timely
information available on the beneficial ownership´ of all legal persons.150 The
identity of the natural persons who ultimately have a controlling ownership
interest in a legal person (e.g., corporation of some type) and the identity of the
natural persons exercising control of the legal person through other means is
the target of transparency requirements.151
In practical terms, ownership transparency can be achieved by the use of a
central registry that collects, stores, and verifies the detailed information
necessary to determine actual beneficial ownership of any and all types of
entities, including trusts and foundations.152 Relevant information captured in
a central registry would include such data as name, legal entity type, formation
documents, related bylaws, address of a registered office or principal place of
business or address of the entity itself, name and address of a registered agent,
names and addresses of persons in position of legal control within the entity
(e.g., directors, officers, and council members), and the name(s) of the
beneficial owner(s).153
One huge obstacle to achievement of practical or actual transparency is that
transparency of ownership requirements is vastly different from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.154 In the U.S. alone, where entity formation legal requirements are
controlled by the states, vast differences make for more favorable entity
formation and maintenance in some states than they do in others. For example,
in 2006, the General Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study and found
that no state collected beneficial ownership information on corporations, only
a few collected it on LLCs and other corporate-like entities, and only four states
collected minimal information on LLCs.155 Less than half of states collected
information about management, directors, and officers of corporations.156
Although most states collected information on corporate officers and LLC
managers in periodic reports, the information in these reports was not verified,
including that pertaining to beneficial ownership.157 This is still the situation
150.
151.
152.
153.

FATF, supra note 5, at 12.
Id.
Kalant, supra note 9, at 1054±55.
VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 71; Kalant, supra note 9, at 1055±

56.
154. Anonymous, Corporate Ownership and Corruption: How to Crack a Shell, THE
ECONOMIST, May 7, 2016, at 56.
155. Martinez, supra note 56, at 194±95; GAO, supra note 49, at 4.
156. GAO, supra note 49, at 16.
157. Id. at 4.
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today.158 Finally, the states do not screen information against criminal watch
lists. The FBI has open investigations that have not been resolved because
beneficial owners are virtually untraceable.159
B. TCSPs and Gatekeepers
The services of gatekeepers are often essential for tax evasion and other
illegal schemes to succeed. Gatekeepers sometimes facilitate the commission
RI D SUHGLFDWH RIIHQVH VXFK DV GLVJXLVLQJ D SHUVRQ¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ D
commercial transaction, commingling property and proceeds, or disguising
property ownership/control by the ultimate beneficial owners.160 *DWHNHHSHUV¶
services help sever the connection between the illegal tax evasion schemer and
the safe enjoyment of his or her interest-earning assets.161 They can also
provide tax evaders ³a veneer of respectability.´162
Gatekeepers or TCSPs are lawyers, accountants, or businesses that create
and provide administrative services for various types of entities, such as
corporations, IBCs, LLCs, foundations, and trusts. ³In some jurisdictions,
[gatekeepers] are the only means for those who wish to establish certain kinds
of legal vehicles, such as [an IBC].´163 In code or civil law countries, certain
entities, such as foundations and IBCs, require a notarial deed for creation,
meaning that notaries must be employed (i.e., hire a TCSP).164
Indispensable administrative procedures performed by TCSPs include
checking for the availability of an entity name, filing appropriate documents
with the authorities, opening bank accounts, providing nominees (when
necessary), acting as registered agents, paying fees, handling annual reporting
obligations and mail forwarding, and providing virtual office facilities.165
Many gatekeepers furnish clients with entities from a wide range of different
jurisdictions.166 Large TCSPs may form an entity for a client in one jurisdiction

158. Martinez, supra note 56, at 194±95.
159. Id. at 195.
160. Stephen Baker & Ed Shorrock, Gatekeepers, Corporate Structures and their Role in Money
Laundering, in INT¶L CTR. FOR ASSET RECOVERY, BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, TRACING STOLEN
ASSETS: A PRACTITIONER¶S HANDBOOK 81, 82 (2009).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; see also Baker & Shorrock, supra
note 160, at 82±83.
164. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84.
165. Id.; Baker & Shorrock, supra note 160, at 82±83.
166. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; Baker & Shorrock, supra note
160, at 82±83.

132

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:111

(e.g., Belize) but retain client data on file in a different jurisdiction. This makes
it more difficult for regulators and forensic accountants to access the
information.167
TCSPs in many offshore jurisdictions have become subject to formal
licensing and regulation, including being audited, meeting anti-money
laundering standards, and applying suitability tests to directors.168 TCSPs in
onshore jurisdictions, particularly states in the U.S., are more loosely
regulated.169 This factor contributes to the large number of foreign persons
creating LLCs and other entities in the U.S. One of the most widely used U.S.
incorporators is Wyoming Corporate Services, a shell/shelf incorporator in
Cheyenne, Wyoming.170
In those cases where an attorney is the TCSP or works for the TCSP, the
attorney±client privilege may erect another barrier to gleaning information by
forensic accountants and investigators.171 The extent to which this barrier exists
varies depending on the laws of the respective jurisdiction.
C. Layering and Chaining of Shell Entities
Tax perpetrators often use a layer or chain of entities established in different
jurisdictions to maximize anonymity and make it almost impossible for forensic
accountants and tax investigators to determine beneficial ownership. In a
layered or tiered legal structure, layers of legal entities are inserted between the
individual beneficial owner(s) and the assets or funds of the shell entity that
moves or holds legal title to those assets or funds.172 The layering or chaining
of various legal entities across numerous jurisdictions (e.g., Jersey, Gibraltar,
the U.S., and the BVI) facilitates access to the international financial or banking
system in the names of different entities.173 Investigators and forensic
accountants may, for example, obtain ownership information on an entity in
Country A and discover that the legal owners of that entity are corporations or
trusts registered in Countries B and C. Offshore countries and entities by no
means possess a monopoly on this type of arrangement. Legal entities in such
167. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; Baker & Shorrock, supra note
160, at 82±83.
168. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 85±86.
169. Id. at 86.
170. Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains,
REUTERS (June 28, 2011, 6:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shell-companiesidUSTRE75R20Z20110628 [https://perma.cc/N6DX-MPPZ].
171. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
172. Id. at 52.
173. Id.
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places as the U.S. and U.K. are also used frequently in layering arrangements.174
The ability to layer or pyramid within and across jurisdictions faces few, if any,
restrictions.175
An example of the use of layered or chained entities for tax purposes
occurred in United States v. Veksler.176 During 1991 and 1992, Richard
McNaughton and Igor Veksler ³were involved in a scheme to evade federal and
states taxes on sales of number two oil, a product that can be used as either
home heating oil or diesel fuel.´177 ³During this period, no taxes were imposed
by the federal government . . .[,] New Jersey or Pennsylvania on the sale of
number two oil for use as home heating oil.´178 ³>7@KH United States, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania did tax the sale of number two oil when it was . . . used
as diesel fuel . . . .´179 The tax was imposed ³on the producer or importer who
first sold the oil to a purchaser who did not hold a Registration for Tax-Free
Transactions (IRS Form 637).´180
7KH WD[ HYDVLRQ VFKHPH LQYROYHG WKH XVH RI D ³GDLV\ FKDLQ´ RI VKHOO
entities.181 ³$µGDLV\FKDLQ¶ is a string of [shell entities] controlled by a single
person or group of persons.´182 In Veksler, ³No. 2 oil was transferred on paper
from [firm to firm] through the daisy chain, first as home heating oil, but then
as diesel fuel . . . to make it difficult to determine which entity was responsible
for the payment of the taxes.´183 The first several shells in the chain would have
an IRS Form 637 and would sell the oil as tax-exempt home heating oil.184 At
some point, the oil would be sold as diesel fuel, but the taxes were never
remitted to the federal and state governments to which they were owed.185
³>T]he same company always made the first taxable sale.´186 This company
ZDVNQRZQDVWKH³EXUQ´RU³EXWWHUIO\´FRPSDQ\DVLWZDVDVKDPRSHUDWLRQ
GHVLJQHGWR³EXUQXS´RU³IO\DZD\´ZKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW V VRXJKWWKHWD[HV

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 53.
62 F.3d 544 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Veksler, 862 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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owed.187 In this daisy chain operation, all of the transactions would occur on
the same day.188 In many transactions, the oil never moved since ³the company
that originally sold the oil as home heating oil also bought it back as diesel fuel
at the end of the chain, then distributed it to retailers.´189 Other than the entities
at the beginning and end, those in the daisy chain had no function other than
the transfer of oil on paper to other entities in the scheme.190 ³These sham
companies typically were run out of one-room offices which contained only a
telephone, fax machine, and a desk.´191 These features match the classic
characteristics of a shell entity, regardless of type of legal structure.
Tax evaders trying to cloak their identity using shell entities create complex
layered networks, which result in a labyrinth for forensic accountants and tax
investigators. TCSPs involved in providing these professional services are
often of little help in investigations as they do not deal with beneficial owners
personally.192 The TCSPs and other gatekeepers are often left untouched by
authorities, even when a fraudster is caught and prosecuted in a shell entity
scheme.193 The TCSPs and other gatekeepers will continue to capitalize on the
needs of tax evaders for chained or layered entities, thereby making the vicious
cycle of layered shell entities a never-ending game.
IV. POLICY REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THE TAX EVASION AND
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP ISSUES
A. U.S. Domestic
Forensic accountants and tax enforcement officials have a very difficult
time untangling the intricate shell entity networks created by tax evaders. Not
unaware of this issue, the U.S. government has attempted policy initiatives to
improve ownership transparency of shell entities.
In 2008, Senators Levin, Coleman, and Obama introduced legislation
HQWLWOHGWKH³,QFRUSRUDWLRQ7UDQVSDUHQF\DQG/DZ(QIRUFHPHQW$VVLVWDQFH$FW
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1341.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Martinez, supra note 56, at 202; Lucy Komisar, Shells, Shams and Corporate Scams, THE
AM. INTEREST (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/01/01/shells-shams-andcorporate-scams [https://perma.cc/2YFR-5GN3].
193. Melanie Hicken & Blake Ellis, These U.S. Companies Hide Drug Dealers, Mobsters and
Terrorists, CNN MONEY (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/09/news/shellcompanies-crime [https://perma.cc/3UJC-EDE5].
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[(ITLEA)]´194 The legislation has been reintroduced several times since 2008
without being enacted into law.195 7KHSXUSRVHRI,7/($LVWR³HQVXUHWKDW
owners and formation agents who form non-publicly held companies in the
8QLWHG 6WDWHV GLVFORVH WKH EHQHILFLDO RZQHUV RI WKRVH FRPSDQLHV´196 First,
ITLEA would place a significant burden on states and formation agents to
collect and maintain a current list of all beneficial owners.197 Second, the
OHJLVODWLRQUHTXLUHVWKHVWDWHWRPDLQWDLQDFRS\RIGULYHU¶VOLFHQVHVRIDOOVXFK
beneficial owners.198 Third, for foreign-held entities in the United States, the
bill requires that a formation agent certify the foreign application for
incorporation in a U.S. state.199 Beneficial owners of foreign-held entities
would have to provide a photocopy of the page of the passport on which the
photo appears.200
The United States is slowly moving forward on the beneficial ownership
issue. ³In June 2016, FinCEN finalized its long-outstanding beneficial
ownership rule, which extends customer due diligence [(CDD)]
requirements . . . to the natural persons behind a legal entity.´201 In June 2017,
a bipartisan group of legislators introduced the Corporate Transparency Act,
which would require FinCEN to collect information on the beneficial owner(s)
of entities created in the United States if it has not been collected at the state
level.202
A piece of legislation that became law in 2010 and does assist in the fight
against U.S. tax evaders is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA).203 ³FATCA looks at all types of entities to identify U.SWD[SD\HUV¶

194. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 2956, 110th Cong.
§ 1 (2008).
195. Tracey Samuelson, Cracking Down on Shell Companies: A Years-Long Debate,
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 7, 2016, 3:56 PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/07/world/shell-comps
[https://perma.cc/LK6L-EKLX].
196. Kalant, supra note 9, at 1054.
197. Id. at 1055.
198. J. W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation
Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 859 (2010).
199. Kalant, supra note 9, at 1056±57.
200. Id. at 1057.
201. Sylwia Wolos, The Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Identification Requirement: Why It
Matters to All of Us, ACAMS TODAY (Sept. 19, 2017), http://acamstoday.org/the-ultimate-beneficialownership-requirement-why-it-matters-to-all-of-us [https://perma.cc/44K8-8ZKN].
202. Id.
203. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471±1474, 6038D (2017) (created); 26 U.S.C. §§ 163, 643, 679, 871, 1291,
1298, 4701, 6011, 6501, 6662, and 6677 (2017) (amended).
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µfinDQFLDODVVHWV¶KHOGLQµILQDQFLDODFFRXQWV¶ outside the UQLWHG6WDWHV´204 The
WHUPV³ILQDQFLDODVVHW´DQG³ILQDQFLDODFFRXQW´³do not refer simply to bankable
assets or accounts with regulated financial institutions . . . .´205 They are
defined broadly to include such things as equity interests in partnerships and
corporations and beneficial interests in trusts.206 FATCA requires all non-U.S.
ILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWRVHDUFKWKHLUUHFRUGVIRUFXVWRPHUVZLWKLQGLFLDRI³86person status, such as a US place of birth, and to report the assets and identities
of such persons to the US TreDVXU\'HSDUWPHQW´207 FATCA intends to weed
out U.S. persons who may be hiding as anonymous beneficiaries of corporate
vehicles.208 FATCA also mandates that such persons self-report their non-U.S.
financial assets (over $50,000) annually to the IRS on Form 8938.209 When
launched, FATCA threatened to impose a 30% withholding tax on certain U.S.
source payments for non-participating persons.210 The 30% tax was a necessary
stick to gain the attention of other governments.211 When over one hundred
countries entered into intergovernmental (bilateral) agreements with the United
States and pledged to incorporate FATCA into their domestic laws, the banks
and other regulated financial institutions became the de facto police
implementing FATCA.212 The law has been implicated in record-breaking
numbers of U.S. citizenship renunciations during the years 2012±2016.213
Legislation to repeal FATCA has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives, WKH OHJLVODWLRQ¶V VSRQVRUV FLWLQJ )$7&$¶V
unconstitutionality, especially its alleged breach of the 4th Amendment.214 A
legal challenge against the constitutionality of FATCA was filed in federal

204. Robert Levine, Aaron Schumacher & Shudan Zhou, FATCA and the Common Reporting
Standard, J. INT¶L. TAX¶N, Mar. 2016, at 43, 44.
205. Id.
206. 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(2).
207. See id.
208. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 82.
209. Id.
210. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 45.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 46.
213. Adam Taylor, A Potentially Historic Number of People Are Giving Up Their U.S.
Citizenship,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp2017/02/10/a-potentially-historic-number-ofpeople-are-giving-up-their-u-s-citizenship.
214. Elizabeth Thompson, Deal That Sends Canadian Bank Records to IRS is ‘Illegal,’ Lawyer
Tells U.S. Committee, CBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fatcacanada-u-s-taxation-1.4087644 [https://perma.cc/PC77-YG84].
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district court in Ohio, but the lawsuit was ultimately dismissed on standing
grounds by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.215
V. OTHER NATIONS
In 2013, the risks of hidden entity beneficial ownership and tax evasion
reached the attention of high-level leaders at the G8 summit in Lough Erne,
Northern Ireland. The G8 countries DQQRXQFHGWKH³G8 Principles, a set of eight
SULQFLSOHV RU D µbeQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS DFWLRQ SODQ¶´ to combat the abuse of
entities via legal arrangements.216 One important outcome from this summit
ZDVWKDWLWVXSSRUWVWKH*¶VDQG2UJDQL]DWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG
'HYHORSPHQW¶V (OECD) call for the adoption of a multilateral exchange of
information on beneficial owners.217
The G8 and FATF recommendations both endeavor to facilitate the
disclosure of data about the identities of beneficial owners. The FATF
recommendations focus on financial institutions while the G8 principles place
the responsibility on the entities themselves.218 The G8 principles do not
specify the type of data that needs to be presented to countries reporting
information on entity beneficial ownership.219 One limitation of the G8
principles is that only eight nations are obligated to follow them.
Inspired by FATCA, in early 2016 the G20 countries committed to move
towards implementing an automatic exchange of information targeting tax
215. Crawford Y86'HS¶WRI7UHDVXU\)G WK&LU 
216. Lakhani, supra note 148, at 125; Biedermann, supra note 51, at 74. The first G8 principle
requires companies to know who owns and controls them and their beneficial ownership. 2013 LOUGH
ERNE
G8
LEADERS¶
COMMUNIQUÉ
23,
(June
18,
2013),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20
7771/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF5S-9EDW]. The second
principle addresses the availability of ownership information to relevant authorities. Id. This principle
recommends that nations make entity data available in central registries. Id. The third principle
requires trustees to have and make available information on beneficiaries and settlors of trusts to law
enforcement and other authorities. Id. The fourth principle centers on educating authorities on the
weaknesses within their anti-money laundering prevention methods. Id. The fifth principle specifically
states that the abuse of mechanisms, such as bearer shares and nominee shareholders and directors,
should be prevented. Id. The sixth principle suggests that states should adopt customer identification
and verification obligations to make sure that beneficiaries are properly vetted. Id. at 24. The seventh
principle addresses enforcement mechanisms that states should use against firms and financial
institutions that do not comply with their obligations. Id. The eighth principle focuses on the need for
international cooperation for information exchange between nations regarding the abuse of corporate
vehicles. Id.
217. 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8 LEADERS¶ COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 6±7.
218. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 46; Lakhani, supra note 148, at 134.
219. See 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8 LEADERS¶ COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 23±24.
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evasion.220 ³The G20 embraced WKH 2(&'¶V SURSRVDORI D JOREDO PRGHO RI
automatic financial data exchange known as the Common Reporting Standard
(CRS).´221 The CRS is FATCA with a global reach that seeks to obtain
information about individuals and entities resident in CRS-signing
jurisdictions, which is held outside their own countries of residence.222
As of June 2018, 102 countries have committed to the adoption of CRS.223
As of July 5, 2018, over 3200 bilateral exchange relationships have been
activated with respect to ninety jurisdictions.224 The CRS consists of the
following four salient parts:
1. A model Competent Authority Agreement (CAA),
providing the international legal framework for the automatic
exchange of CRS information;225
2. The Common Reporting Standard;226
3. The Commentaries on the CAA and the CRS;227 and

220. Guilherme B. Reis, Common Reporting Standard Explained, TR. & EST., May 2016, at 37,
37.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Activated
Exchange
Relationships
for
CRS
Information,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/
[https://perma.cc/9ZNY-QMVJ] (last visited Aug. 18, 2018).
224. Id.
225. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION
IN TAX MATTERS 3 (2d ed. 2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automaticexchange-of-financial-account-information-in-tax-matters-second-edition_9789264267992-en#page5
[https://perma.cc/VX7W-VTPF]; What is the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technicalassistance/aeoi/whatisthemultilateralcompetentauthorityagreement.htm
[https://perma.cc/P4P68W9B] (last visited Aug. 18, 2018).
226. The OECD has released a manual entitled Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS
Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures (approved on March 8, 2018 by the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs) to assist nations who have committed to the adoption of the CRS. OECD,
MODEL MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES FOR CRS AVOIDANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND OPAQUE
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/modelmandatory-disclosure-rules-for-crs-avoidance-arrangements-and-opaque-offshore-structures.htm
[https://perma.cc/R9XA-M6SZ]. The purpose of the model mandatory disclosure rules is to provide
tax administrators with information on CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore
Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures. Id. at 3. The mandatory disclosure rules do not affect
WKH VXEVWDQWLYH SURYLVLRQV RI D MXULVGLFWLRQ¶V &56 OHJLVODWLRQ RU LPSDFW RQ DQ\ UHSRUWLQJ RXWFRPHV
under the CRS. Id. The rules are information-gathering tools that seek to bolster the integrity of the
CRS by deterring advisors and other intermediaries from promoting certain schemes. Id.; OECD, supra
note 225, at 3.
227. OECD, supra note 225, at 3.
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4. The CRS XML Schema User Guide.228
Despite the implementation and cooperation of participating CRS
countries, information from academic studies, media leaks, and tax compliance
authorities show that professional advisors and other intermediaries continue to
design, market, or assist in the implementation of offshore structures and
arrangements that can be used by non-compliant taxpayers to circumvent the
correct reporting of relevant tax information.229
CRS is a mix of bilateral and multilateral regimes and hundreds of
intergovernmental agreements among CRS signatories are already in place.230
FATCA is basically a bilateral regime whereby the United States enters into
one of two types of IGAs with each of its partner countries and they exchange
information bilaterally.231 Under CRS, the exchange of information is always
bilateral among the signatories. Each pair of signatories must notify each other
before exchange of information begins.232 ³Each CRS signatory is free to
modify the CAA and . . . implement CRS obligations under its own laws.´233
CRS does not involve a withholding tax like FATCA, since all signatories agree
to incorporate CRS provisions into their domestic laws.234
Similar to FATCA, CRS obligations depend RQ DQ HQWLW\¶V FODVVLILFDWLRQ
and country of residence. Entities include corporations, partnerships, trusts,
and foundations that are classified as reporting or non-reporting financial
institutions, passive non-financial entities (NFEs), or active NFEs.235 Financial
institutions include banks, brokers, custodians, and investment funds.236
³Reporting financial institutions are subject to a comprehensive set of duties or
obligations.´237 TCSPs are generally financial institutions for CRS purposes.238
228. Id. The OECD and cooperating countries have developed a schema in extensible mark-up
language (XML) that allows the reporting of information under the CRS in an IT-based and
standardized manner. Common Reporting Standard (CRS) User Guide and Schema, OECD (2018),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/schema-and-userguide/#d.en345315 [https://perma.cc/6UXK-P47H]. A schema is a data structure for holding and
transmitting information electronically and in bulk. Id.
229. OECD, supra note 226, at 3.
230. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 44.
231. Id.
232. For a detailed explanation concerning the exchange of information under CRS, see OECD,
supra note 225, at 230±71.
233. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 45.
234. Id. at 46.
235. Reis, supra note 220, at 38.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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The way that CRS rules function demonstrates a clear policy focus on
control, apart from ownership.239 CRS regulations blur the lines between
controlling persons and beneficial owners.240 On the other hand, ³FATCA
consistently seeks to identify U.S. WD[SD\HUV¶EHQHILFLal ownership in non-U.S.
passive assets, the idea being that the tax liabilities are attached to income
derived from ownership.´241 Despite this difference, FATCA and CRS share
one stated policy goal: to fight tax evasion.
In November 2016, the G20 nations published a set of principles for
governments to facilitate identification of the beneficial owners of shell
entities.242 The principles stopped short of recommending public access to
registries of beneficial ownership. In the European Union, the Fourth AML
Directive requires member states to introduce registries of company beneficial
owners.243 The U.K. beneficial ownership registry opened in April 2016, but
excluded trusts.244 The U.K. has set precedent ³by creating µWKHZRUOG¶VILUVW
fully open register of beneficial ownership,¶ albeit only disclosing those
beneficial owners that meet the 25% threshold.´245 ³Where [registries] did
become available in other European countries, the quality of data (often
collected but not verified) was criticized by industry experts.´246 Beneficial
ownership registries in the BVI and Cayman Islands went on stream in June
2017 to comply with an agreement reached with the U.K. government.247 The
Cayman Islands also just amended its penal code in December 2017 so that
foreign tax evasion and equivalent tax crimes are reportable in the Cayman
Islands.248 On July 1, 2017, a beneficial ownership registry commenced
239. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 48.
240. Id.
241. Id.; 26 U.S.C. §§1471±1474, 6038D (2017) (created); 26 U.S.C. §§163, 643, 679, 871,
1291, 1298, 4701, 6011, 6501, 6662, and 6677 (2017) (amended).
242. Jamie Smyth & George Parker, G20 Leaders Back Drive to Unmask Shell Companies, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/25ae632e-6d60-11e4-8f96-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/4HNW-GA5Y].
243. Wolos, supra note 201.
244. Id.
245. Jenik Radon & Mahima Achuthan, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: The Cure for the
Panama Paper Ills, 70 J. INT¶L. AFF. 87, 87 (2017), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/beneficial-ownershipdisclosure-%C2%A0cure%C2%A0-panama-papers-ills%C2%A0 [https://perma.cc/MQ2R-G9NM].
246. Wolos, supra note 201.
247. Virgin Islands (British)/Cayman Islands Economy: Quick View-Beneficial Ownership
Registries
Go
Live,
VIEWSWIRE
(July
10,
2017),
http://search.eiu.com/Default.aspx?sText=virgin+islands+528british%29%2F+cayman+islands+econ
omy.
248. Martin Livingston, Tim Dawson, Adam Huckle, Anthony Webster & Tom Katsaros,
Further Important Changes to the Cayman Islands AML Regime, MAPLES (Feb. 5, 2018),
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operation in Guernsey.249 Access is restricted to the economic crime division
of law enforcement and certain other persons in Guernsey government.250
In December 2017, an agreement was reached between the European
Parliament and the EU Council on the latest amendments to the Anti-Money
Laundering Directive (AMLD 5).251 The amendments attempt to prevent the
use of the financial system for funding white-collar crime such as tax evasion.252
The following measures will be introduced in EU member states:
x Registers of beneficial owners of firms will be made
publicly accessible and national registries will be
better interconnected;253
x Registers of beneficial owners of trusts and similar
legal arrangements will only be publicly accessible
where there is legitimate need;254
x Information on national banks and safe deposit boxes
will be registered as well as data on real estate
ownership (only to public authorities);255
x The 5th AMLD introduces a requirement for member
states to verify beneficial ownership information
submitted to their registries;256 and
x EU bank customers who send funds internationally
must provide personal data so it can be transmitted to
all banks in the payment chain.257

http://maplesandcalder.com/news/article/further-important-changes-to-the-cayman-islands-amlregime-1647 [https://perma.cc/SA84-AD58].
249. Alan Bougourd, Presentation at the ICSA: Beneficial Ownership Register (Apr. 16, 2017)
(presentation slides available at http://www.guernseyregistry.com/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=107438
&p=0 [https://perma.cc/F8YZ-VZF9]).
250. Id.
251. Robert van der Jagt, Euro Tax Flash from KPMG’s EU Tax Centre, KPMG (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/12/etf-351-amld5-and-ubo-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/D9S4-3B8S].
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Aleksandar Ivanovski, Mary Dineen, Filipa Correia & Piergiorgio Valente, CFE’s Tax Top
5: Key Tax News of the Week, CFE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.ieciab.be/fr/membres/publication/actualite/Institut/Documents/2017/CFE-Tax-Top-5-18-December2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHY6-Z4FY].
257. 'HQLV 2¶&RQQRU EU Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Can Banks Handle It?,
KYC360 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://kyc360.com/article/eu-fifth-anti-money-laundering-directive-keypoints-banks [https://perma.cc/L245-2WKU].
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The potential implementation of the 5th AMDL requirements remains to be
seen since few member states took up the 4th AMDL option of implementing
publicly accessible central registries of corporate beneficial owners.258
Beneficial ownership disclosure by itself is not the complete answer to tax
evasion and lost revenues issues. Such disclosure is most effective when
accompanied by well-drafted criminal tax laws, sustained enforcement, modern
technology, and sustained political will.259
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax evaders and others form and use various types of domestic and
offshore legal shell entities to conceal their identities as beneficial owners of
assets, funds, and the earnings therefrom. A beneficial owner is a natural
person who controls and enjoys an asset, its benefits, or both. Shell entities
often have no significant assets or ongoing business activity. The vulnerability
of shell entities to tax evaders is amplified when they are privately rather than
publicly owned. The extensive abuse of domestic and offshore shell entities to
conceal and transfer assets and commit tax fraud make them an important
aspect of the work of forensic accountants and tax law enforcement.
Trillions of dollars are located in secrecy jurisdictions around the globe.260
The traditional stereotypes of financial secrecy and tax havens are mostly
inaccurate. The locations that provide the most secrecy are Switzerland, the
United States, Cayman Islands, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Hong Kong, and certain other nations²not small, tropical islands.261
White-collar criminals use various shell entities to commit tax evasion on
a grand scale. Such criminals may choose from a list of different types of legal
structures. These various structures include LLCs, shelf corporations, LLPs,
FLPs, IBCs, asset protection trusts, private interest foundations, and company
foundations. Each entity type has its own unique structure and legal
characteristics. Nominees, nominee directors, and bearer shares are legal
devices used in combination with shell entities to optimize evasion and
concealment.
Three principal reasons explain the ability of tax evaders and others to
continue to hide their identities as beneficial owners and operators. One reason
is a legal framework in many jurisdictions that promotes lack of ownership
transparency. Another reason is that those who abuse shell entities need the
services of gatekeepers such as accountants, lawyers, and TCSPs. A third
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Radon & Achuthan, supra note 245.
Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 31.
Id.
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reason is the layering or chaining of numerous shell entities in different
jurisdictions that make it virtually impossible for forensic accountants and tax
authorities to discern the real identity of beneficial owners.
Various global organizations, such as the FATF, OECD, and groups of
countries, such as the G8 and G20, have started to cooperate in dealing with the
issue of hidden entity beneficial ownership and exchange of tax-related
information.262 Improved information exchange is one of the means being used
to combat concealed beneficial ownership and tax evasion.263 The creation of
ownership registries is another goal of G8, G20, the FATF, and the OECD that
is starting to receive attention and some government action.264 The use of
ownership registries is complicated by numerous issues such as privacy
infringement, placing excessive burdens on financial institutions, infringing on
national sovereignty, bank secrecy, violation of contractual relationships, and
others. Global efforts on improving tax-related information exchange and
entity ownership transparency are moving ahead at a modest pace.

262. See FATF, supra note 5, at 12; Reis, supra note 220, at 37; 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8
LEADERS¶ COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 6±8.
263. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 77.
264. Smyth & Parker, supra note 242; FATF, supra note 5, at 13; OECD, supra note 225, at
136±38.
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APPENDIX A
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Companies*

Country

Information provided Is there a
Corporate Nominee
Foreign
when registered ( ݲresidency Bearer shares directors directors companies
requirement? permitted? permitted? permitted? registered?
=provided)

References

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ

Legal owners
Anguilla

Officers

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Companies Act
2000, §§1, 5(1), 7,
28(5), 99, 188

Yes

Companies Act
1995, §§4, 29(2),
62(2), 69, 99, 176,
340

Yes

Companies Act
1992, §§3, 6, 48,
118; Business
Licenses Act 1980;
International
Business Companies
Act 2000, §§181,
184, 185

Yes

Regulations of June
2001; Companies
Act, §§5, 38, 251

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ

Legal owners
Antigua and
Barbuda Officers

Yes

No

No

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors

Legal owners
The
Bahamas Officers

No

No (Warrants
permitted)

No

Immobilized
(Warrants
permitted)

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ

Legal owners
Belize

*

Officers

Yes

VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 220±31.

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
60% local
ownership,
unless
declared an
Exempt
Company

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Bermuda Officers

No

No

Yes

Companies Act
(CA) 1981, §§6, 53,
62(1-2), 91,(1-2),
98, 133; CA
Amendment 2009,
3rd Schedule, Part I
(§114)

Yes

Business Companies
Act (BCA) 2004,
§§5, 9; BCA
Amendment 2005,
§§2, 55, 67-77,132;
International BCA
2000, §§185, 186

Yes

Companies Law
(CL) (2009
Revision), §§26,
163, 179, 229(1),
230

No

Yes

International
Companies Act
(ICA) 1981-82,
§§13, 35(1), 36, 83,
91, 201, 226A; ICA
Amendment 2003,
No. 5, §35A

Yes

Yes;
however,
requires
permit of
the Central
Bank of
Cyprus

Companies Law,
Ch. 113, §§14, 75,
81, 102, 192, 197,
347; Cyprus Income
Tax Law, No. N118
(I), 2002

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
British
Virgin
Islands
(BVI)

Legal owners
No

Officers

Immobilized

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Cayman
Islands

Officers

No

Immobilized

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Cook Islands Officers

ݲ

No

Immobilized
(Warrants
permitted)

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
To be
resident,
company
Managers/directors  ݲmust be
managed in
Legal owners
Cyprus (not
just
No (Warrants
 ݲincorporated) permitted)
Officers
Registered agent

Cyprus

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent
Managers/directorsݲ
Legal owners
Czech
Republic Officers

ݲ
ݲ

No

Dematerialized
(Warrants
Permitted)

No

Yes

Yes

Commercial Code
(Act No. 513/1991
Coll.), §§24, 28, 62,
156, 175, 184(5),
194(5,7), 217a

Yes

Delaware Code,
Title 8, Ch. 1, §§
101, 132, 141(a),
145, 158, 371

Yes

Companies Law
2009, DIFC Law
No. 2 of 2009, Art.
11, 38, 51, 115

Yes

Florida Business
Corp. Act. §607
(203, 723, 802, 850,
1401, 1501, 1503);
OECD Tax Cooperation 2009,
"Towards a Level
Playing Field,"
p.122

Yes

Companies
Ordinance, §§14,
15, 63, 136, 289

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Delaware,
United States Officers

No

No

No

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directorsݲ
Dubai, Legal owners
United Arab
Emirates Officers

No

No

No

Yes

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directorsݲ
Legal owners
Florida,
United States Officers

ݲ

No

No

No

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directorsݲ
Legal owners
Gibraltar Officers

No

No

Yes

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Yes

Companies
(Guernsey) Law
2008 §§14, 15, 17,
75, 77(e), 132, 143;
Bailiwick of
Guernsey Law 2000

Yes

Hong Kong
Companies
Ordinance, §§14,
73, 153(B), 154,
333

Yes

Companies Act
1931, §§5, 12, 64,
312

Yes

Companies Act
2006, §§5, 2, 30, 74,
91, 112, 162

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Guernsey Officers

No

No

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Hong Kong
SAR, China Officers

Company
 ݲsecretary
must be
 ݲresident

No (Warrants
permitted)

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Isle of Man
(1)
Officers

No

No

Yes

No

Yes (must
be licensed)

No

No (note
that there
are some
limitations)

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Isle of Man Managers/directors
(2) New
Legal owners
Manx
Vehicle
(NMV) Officers

No

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Jersey

Officers

No

Yes

Companies (Jersey)
Information Law 1991, Art. 3, 7,
42, 73, 77
Unavailable
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Physical Address
Registered office

1 board
member must
Registered agent
be a citizen
of an EEA
Managers/directors  ݲstate and
have a
Legal owners
permanent Yes (note that
office in there are some
Liechtenstein limitations)
Liechtenstein Officers

Yes

Yes

Personen- und
Gesellschaftsrecht,
Art. 180, 279, 291,
263; Ordinance of
11 Jan 2005 on Due
Diligence Act, Art.
3; OECD Tax Cooperation 2009,
"Towards a Level
Information Playing Field," p.
214
Unavailable

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Luxembourg Officers

No

Yes (AML
rules require
ID of
beneficial
owner)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loi concernant les
Sociétés
Commerciales 27,
(10 August 1915),
Art. 11, 27, 51;
OECD Tax Cooperation 2009,
"Towards a Level
Playing Field,"
p.221, fn.3

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners

ݲ

Mauritius Officers

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Companies Act
2001, §§23, 49, 88,
131, 133, 161, 276
Yes
Netherlands Antilles
Commercial Code,
Art. 33-155; Civil
Code, Art. 19;
National Decree of
Dec. 22, 2009,
implementation of
Art. 20 of the Trade
Register Ordinance
(2009 Trade
Information Register Decree),
Unavailable
Art. 15

Yes

Nevada Revised
Statutes, §§78.030,
Information 78.035, 78.235(1),
Unavailable 78.115, 77.310

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Netherlands
Antilles Officers

One resident Yes (note that
managing there are some
 ݲdirector
limitations)

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Nevada,
United States Officers

No

No

No
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Nevis

Officers

No

Yes
(Corporate
directors
must have
individuals
as
Immobilized directors)

Yes

Yes

Nevis Business
Corporations
Ordinance 1999,
§25; Companies Act
1996 (No. 22 of
1996), §§4, 51, 72,
73, 195

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ

Yes

Business
Corporations Act,
§§5, 14, 100, 118,
Information 119, 136; Securities
Unavailable Transfer Act 2006

Yes

Yes

Commercial Code
Decree-Law No. 32
of 1927, DecreeLaw No. 5 of 1997,
Articles 1, 2, 6, 28,
49, 90

Yes

Companies
Ordinance 1972,
§§3, 10, 21, 100,
164, 310

Yes

Companies Act,
Ch. 50, §§19, 66,
126, 145, 171, 172,
367; Business
Registration Act,
Ch. 32 §6

Legal owners
Ontario,
Canada

Officers

No

Dematerialized

No

Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Panama

Officers

No

Yes (note that
there are some
limitations)

No

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Seychelles Officers

No

No

No

Yes

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Singapore Officers

At least one
director must
be ordinarily
 ݲresident

No

No

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners

South Africa
(1) Company Officers

No

No

Yes (note
that there
are some
limitations)

Yes

Yes

Companies Act
2008, §§14, 19, 23,
50, 51, 56, 66, 69,
78

Yes

Companies Act
1996 (No. 22 of
1996), §§4, 8, 51,
72, 73, 195

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
St. Kitts

Officers

ݲ

No

Yes (must
have
individuals
as
Immobilized directors)

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
St. Vincent Legal owners
and the
Grenadines Officers

No
Directors
Physical Address  ݲmay be
foreigners
Registered office
residing
abroad.
Registered agent  ݲSomeone
who can sign
for the
Managers/directors
company (not
necessarily a
Legal owners
director)
must be
Switzerland Officers
resident

No

Yes

Yes

No

The Companies Act,
No. 8 of 1994, §§4,
9, 29, 62, 69, 176,
340
Yes
Yes
Code of
Obligations,
Ordinanza sul
registro di
commercio del 17
ottobre 2007 (Stato
1° gennaio 2008),
Art. 66-68; OECD
Tax Co-operation
2009, "Towards a
Level Playing
Information Information Field," (2009), p.
221, fn. 3
Unavailable Unavailable

Yes

Turks and Caicos,
Companies
Ordinance (CO)
1998, Ch. 122, §§4,
32, 208; CO
(Amendment),
2001; Business
Names Ordinance,
(5); CO 1981 (as
amended), (6)

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Turks and
Caicos Officers

No

Immobilized

Yes

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
United
Kingdom Officers

ݲ

No

Yes

Yes (at
least one
director
must be an
individual)

Yes

Companies Act
2006, Parts 2, 9, 12,
21 (783, 779), Part
10 (155, 232);
OECD Tax Cooperation 2009,
"Towards a Level
Information Playing Field,"
Unavailable (2009), p. 221, fn. 3

Physical Address ݲ

No

Ley N° 16.060
Sociedades
Comerciales, art.
13; Ley N° 17.904,
art. 13, 16; OECD
Tax Co-operation
2009, "Towards a
Level Playing
Information Information Information Field," (2009), p.
221
Dematerialized Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable

No

Wyoming Business
Corporation Act,
§17-16-201, -202, 625, -723, -802, 803, -851, -1801;
§17-17-102

Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Uruguay Officers

ݲ

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Wyoming,
United States Officers

No

No

Yes

Yes

APPENDIX B
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Exempt International Business
Companies*
Bearer
Information provided Is there a
Local
share
Corporate Nominee
when registered ( ݲresidency
business Bearer shares warrants directors directors
requirement? permitted? permitted? permitted? permitted? permitted? References
Country
=provided)
Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent ݲ
Managers/directors

Legal owners
Anguilla Officers

*

No

No

Immobilized

Yes

VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 232±38.

Yes

Yes

Custody of
Bearer Shares
Regulations,
Revised
Regulations of
Anguilla: I203, §§2-3;
International
Business
Companies
Act 2000, §§7,
16(1)(a & g),
39, 56
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Yes

Yes

International
Business
Corporations
Act, §§5, 61,
97, 111(5),
130(2);
Companies
Act, §344;
Corporate
Management
and Service
Providers
Act

Yes

International
Business
Companies
Act 2000,
§§4, 10, 13,
40, 58, 187;
Business
Licenses Act
1980

Yes

International
Business
Companies
Act 1990, as
amended in
2000, §§3, 9,
12, 47, 63;
Regulations
of June 2001

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ

Antigua Legal owners
and
Barbuda Officers

No

No

Dematerialized

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
The
Bahamas Officers

No

Must be
licensed

No

Information Information
Unavailable Unavailable

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Belize Officers

No

Yes (must be
kept with local
trust and
company
service
Information
Unavailable provider)

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors

Legal owners
Bermuda Officers

At least 2
directors, or
secretary and
director, or a
secretary and
a resident
representative

Must be
licensed

Companies
Information Information Information Information Act 1981,
Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable §§129, 130

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Cayman
Islands Officers

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Companies
Law (2009
Revision),
§§26, 163,
179, 229(1),
230;
Companies
Law (2009
Revision)
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Information Information Information Information
Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable

Financial
Services Act
2007, as
described in
Circular
Letter
(CL201207)
of 21
December
2007 entitled
"New
Conceptal
Approach to
Global
Business";
Companies
Act, §23
Financial
Services Act
2007, as
described in
Circular
Letter
(CL201207)
of 21
December
2007 entitled
"New
Conceptal
Approach to
Global
Business";
Companies
Act, §23

Immobilized

Yes

Nevis
Business
Corporations
Ordinance
1984, §§21,
31, 56, 123

Yes

International
Business
Companies
Act 1994,
§§5, 12, 41,
56, 82

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Mauritius
(2) Global
business
company
category 1
(GBC1) Officers

 ݲAt least two
directors
must be a
resident
individual;
Shareholders
must be
nonresident

May
conduct
specified
activities
within Information Information Information Information
Mauritius Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners

ݲ
At least one
director
must be a
resident;
Shareholders
must be
nonresident

Mauritius
(3) Global
business
company
category 2
(GBC2) Officers

No

153

Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Nevis

Officers

No

No

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Seychelles Officers

No

No

No

No

Yes
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Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ

No

Companies
Act 1996 (No.
Information Information Information Information Information 22 of 1996),
Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable §§195, 206

No

International
Business
Companies
Act 1999, §§4,
7, 28, 42, 57

Legal owners
St. Kitts Officers

ݲ

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
St. Lucia Officers

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Physical Address
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
St. Vincent Legal owners
and the
Grenadines Officers

No

No

No

No

Physical Address ݲ
Registered office ݲ
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Turks and
Caicos Officers

International
Business
Companies
(Amendment
and
Consolidation)
Act 2007,
§§4-7, 11, 14,
29, 30, 84
Immobilized
Yes
Yes
Yes
Companies
Ordinance
(CO) 1998,
Ch. 122. §§4,
32, 180, 192,
208; CO
(Amendment)
2001;
Business
Names
Information Information Information (Registration)
Immobilized Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Ordinance, §5
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APPENDIX C
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Limited Liability Companies*

Country

Information provided
when registered (ݲ
=provided)

Is there a
residency
requirement?

Corporate
members
permitted?

Nominee
members
permitted?

References

No

Yes

Information
Unavailable

Limited Liability Company Act,
§§11, 28

Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Anguilla

Officers
Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Antigua and
Barbuda Officers

No

Yes

Yes

Antigua and Barbuda International
Limited Liability Companies Act
2007, §§12, 17

No

No

Yes

Limited Liability Companies Act
2008, §§11, 12, 26

Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Cook Islands Officers
Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Czech
Republic

*

Legal owners

ݲ

Officers

ݲ

No

No

No, but one
individual
may not be a
member of
more than 3
Commercial Code (Act. No.
LLCs
513/1991 Coll.), §§24, 28, 62, 105

VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 239±44.
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Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

No

No

Yes

Delaware Code, Title 6, Ch. 18, §§
18-301, 18-902.; Certificate of
formation must be filed with
Secretary of State; foreign LLC
must be registered; LLC Act, Ch.II,
s. 18-201(a)(2)

No

No

Yes

Companies Law 2009, DIFC Law
No. 2 of 2009, Art. 11

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Delaware,
United States Officers
Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Dubai, United
Arab Emirates Officers
Physical Address

ݲ

Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Florida, United
States
Officers

No

Yes

Yes

Florida Limited Liability Company
Act, §§608.407(1), 608.409,
608.501

No

Yes

Yes

Limited Liability Companies Act
1996, §§4-7

No

Information
Unavailable

Information
Unavailable

Loi concernant les Sociétés
Commerciales 27, (10 August
1915), §§11bis

Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners

ݲ

Isle of Man Officers
Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Luxembourg Officers
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Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Nevada,
United States Officers

No

Yes

Yes

Nevada Revised Statutes, §§77, 86

Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors
Legal owners
Nevis

Officers

No

Yes

Yes

Nevis Limited Liability Company
Ordinance 1995, §§21, 26, 37, 47,
83

No

Yes

Yes

Law No. 4 of 2009 (Replaced Law
No. 24 of 1966), Art. 5, 38

No

Yes

Yes

Limited Liability Companies Act
2008, §§12, 34, 76

Information
Unavailable

Art. 814 Code of Obligations;
Ordinanza sul registro di
commercio del 17 ottobre 2007
(Stato 1° gennaio 2008), Art. 73

Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ

Panama

Legal owners

ݲ

Officers

ݲ

Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent
Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines Officers
Physical Address

ݲ

Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Switzerland Officers

ݲ

Yes (note that
there are some
limitations)

Information
Unavailable
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Physical Address
Registered office

ݲ

Registered agent
Managers/directors
Legal owners
Turks and
Caicos

Officers

No

Yes

Yes

Turks and Caicos, Companies
Ordinance 1998

Yes

Wyoming Limited Liability
Company Act, §§17-15-106; 17-15107

Physical Address
Registered office
Registered agent

ݲ

Managers/directors ݲ
Legal owners
Wyoming,
United States Officers

No

Yes
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APPENDIX D
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Trusts*

Country

Anguilla

The
Bahamas

*

Entity
registered?

Is there a residency
requirement?

Optional

Where beneficiary is
resident, and no trustee is
resident, beneficiary may
apply for resident trustee
to be appointed

No

No

Flee clauses
prohibited?

Settlor can be other
parties in the trust?

References

No

Settlor may be the
trustee, beneficiary, or
protector

Trusts Act 2000, §§8, 66

No

Trustee Act 1998, §§3, 94;
Settlor may be
beneficiary, cotrustee, Registration of Records
Act, Ch. 187
or protector

VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 252±59.
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Belize

Bermuda

British
Virgin
Islands
(BVI) (2)

BVI (2) Virgin
Islands
Special Trust
(VISTA)

Cayman
Islands

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Optional

No

No

No
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No

Settlor may be the
trustee, beneficiary, or Trusts Act 2000, §§ 4 (3protector
6), 9, 13, 20, 63

No

Settlor may retain
certain rights and
powers, trustee may be Trusts (Special Provisions)
beneficiary
Act 1989, §§2, 12

No

Not allowed
following
court order,
criminal
Trustee (Amendment) Act
At least one trustee must proceedings,
Settlor may be
beneficiary, cotrustee, or 2003, §11; BVI Trustee
be a BVI Trust and
or
Act 1961, §§2, 81, 86
protector
Company Service Provider investigations

No

Trust deed must provide
appointment of enforcer
and at least one trustee
must be a "designated
person" (essentially a BVI
licensed trustee)

No

No

No

No

No restrictions on
settlor's role

Virgin Islands Special
Trusts Act 2003

Trusts Law (2009
Revision), §§13, 14, 89;
Tasarruf Meduati Fonu v.
Merrill Lynch Bank and
Trust Company (Cayman)
Ltd of 9 Sept 2009,
provided confirmation that
Settlor may be
"reserved powers"
beneficiary, cotrustee, or legislation is upheld in its
protector
home jurisdictions
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Cyprus

Delaware,
United States
(1) Common
Law Trust

161

No

Either the settlor or any of
Companies Law, Ch. 113,
§112; Cyprus Trustees
the beneficiaries is a
Information
Law, Ch. 193
Unavailable Information Unavailable
Cypriot

No

Settlor can create an
irrevocable trust, where
the settlor is a
beneficiary, while
retaining various
Information interests in, and powers
over, the trust
Unavailable

Certificate of
Delaware, Trust must be
United States filed with
(2) Statutory Secretary of
Trust
State

No

One trustee must be a
resident of Delaware

No

Delaware Code, Title 12,
Ch. 35, §3556; Qualified
Dispositions in Trust Act,
12 Del. C. §3570 et seq.
(1997)

Settlor may be
Delaware Code, Title 12,
beneficiary; any person Ch. 38, §§3801, 3802,
3806-7, 3807, 3852
may be manager of trust

Dubai,
United Arab
Emirates

No

No

No

No restrictions on
settlor's role

DICF Trust Law of 2005,
Articles 23, 24, 29, 68

Florida,
United States

No

No

No

No restrictions on
settlor's role

Florida Trust Code
§§736.0401, 736.0409
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Gibraltar

Guernsey
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No, unless
settlor wants to
use special
asset protection
under
bankruptcy
ordinance

No

No, but any
interest in land,
which is in
writing, must
be registered
Hong Kong with the Land
Registry
SAR, China

No

No

No

No

No

No

Isle of Man
(1)

No

No

No

Isle of Man
(2) Purpose
Trust

No

Must use at least one Isle
of Man trustee

No

No restrictions on
settlor's role

[102:111

Registered Trust Act, §§3,
8; Trustee Act of
Gibraltar; the Registered
Trust Ordinance 1999

Settlor may revoke or
amend the terms of a
trust; give trustees
directions in relation to
investments or remove a
trustee, beneficiary, or
enforcer; settlor or
trustee of a trust may
The Trusts (Guernsey)
also be a beneficiary Law 2007, §§8, 15(1), 38

No restrictions on
settlor's role

Hong Kong Trustee
Ordinance, Ch. 29;
Recognition of Trusts
Ordinance, Ch. 76

No restrictions on
settlor's role

Recognition of Trusts Act
1988; In Re
Heginbotham's Petition
1999

Information Unavailable Purpose Trusts Act 1996

2018]

SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY

Jersey

No

No

Yes; if created
for longer than
12 months
At least one trustee must
be an European Economic
must be
Liechtenstein registered in Area (EEA) Member State
(1) - Private the Public
Trust and Company
Register
Trust
Service Provider

Liechtenstein
(2) - Trust
Enterprise

Mauritius

Yes

One of the trustees must be
a Liechtenstein Trust and
Company Service Provider

No

Must have local Trust and
Company Service Provider
serving as a trustee;
nonresident settlors and
beneficiaries may apply for
GBC1 and GBC2 license

Business trusts
must be filed
Nevada, with Secretary
of State
United States

No

163

No

Settlors may maintain
control and a beneficial Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984,
interest in the trust
Articles 7, 9, 12

No

Law on Persons and
Beneficiary may be
Companies (PGR), LGBI
trustee, but not if sole 4/1/1926, Art. 897-932,
beneficiary; settlor may 900, 902; Law onf Trust
be beneficiary, but not if Enterprises, LGBI 6/1928,
sole beneficiary
PGR Art. 932a

No

Settlor may reserve
rights in the trust
instrument

Law on Persons and
Companies (PGR), Art.
932a, §§1, 7, 49

No

Settlor may also be a
trustee, a beneficiary, a
protector, or an
enforcer, but shall not
be the sole beneficiary
of a trust of which
he/she is a settlor

Trusts Act 2001, §§4, 8,
19, 23, 27; Registration
Duty Act, 1982 and the
Transcription and
Registration Act 1982

Settlor may maintain
power to amend trust

Nevada Revised Statutes,
Ch. 88 (Business Trusts);
Nevada Revised Statutes,
§63.160

No

164
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Nevis

All
International
Trusts and
qualified
foreign Trusts
must be
registered with
the Registrar of
International
Trusts

No

No

Ontario,
Canada

No

No

No

No restrictions on
settlor's role

Trustee Act

No

Settlor can be a
beneficiary of the trust
but cannot administer
any of its assets; settlor
cannot be the trustee

Law No. 1 of 1984

No

Settlor may be the
enforcer; can also be a
beneficiary under the
International Trust Act
international trust (but 1994, §§4, 13, 14, 17, 75,
76
not a sole beneficiary)

No

The Trustees
Trustee may delegate (Amendment) Act 2004
power to settlor (not to and The Trust Companies
beneficiaries)
Act 2005

Panama

No, only trusts
holding
property in
Panama must Agent must be Panamanian
be registered
lawyer

Must file a
brief
declaration by
the licensed
resident trustee
with the
Settlor may not be a
Government Seychelles resident (under
Registry
international trust)
Seychelles

Singapore
(foreign
trust)

No

Every settlor and
beneficiary must be either
(a) individuals who are
neither citizens nor
residents of Singapore or
(b) foreign companies,
including unit trusts
beneficially owned wholly
by such individuals or
foreign companies

Settlor may be the International Exempt Trust
trustee, beneficiary, or Ordinance 1994, §§9, 37,
47
protector

2018]

SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY

South Africa

St. Kitts

Yes

Yes

No, but if
registered must
be by a local
Trust and
Company
St. Lucia
Service
(International
Trust)
Provider

St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines
(International
Trust)

Optional

Switzerland

Information
Unavailable

No

One trustee must be
resident

No
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No

Information Unavailable

Trust Property Control Act
57 of 1988, §4

No

Settlor may retain
control; settlor or
beneficiary may be
protector

Trusts Act 1996, §§4, 19,
25, 95

No

Settlor may retain
control and be a
beneficiary

International Trusts Act
1999, §§3, 7, 9, 19, 22

Settlor is permitted to
retain substantive
control or have "reserve
powers" over the trust;
settlor may be
beneficiary or the sole The Companies Act, No. 8
beneficiary; settlor may
Neither the settlor nor any
of 1994, §186; The
not be trustee; settlor
beneficiary may be
International Trust Act
may be protector
1996, §§9, 12, 36, 52
resident
No
Ratified the Hague
Convention the
international recognition
of trusts; as financial
intermediaries, trustees
have the obligation to
obtain an authorization
from the Federal Money
Laundering Control
Authority or to be
Information
affiliated to a SRO (selfInformation Unavailable Unavailable Information Unavailable regulatory organization)
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Turks and
Caicos
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No

No

No

No

The Trusts Ordinance
1998, Ch. 124, Paras. 3, 7,
9, 12

United
Kingdom

Not registered
unless charity

No

No

No

Trusts of Land and
Appointment of Trustees
Act 1996; Trustee Act
2000

Uruguay

If holding land,
must be
registered

No

No

Settlor can also be the
beneficiary of the trust

Uruguayan Trust Law,
§17.703

No

Settlor retains power to Wyoming Uniform Trust
add or remove trustees Code, §§4-10-401, -403, and to amend trust
103, -510, -602

No (only
statutory trust Trustee may not be settlor
and must be resident of
Wyoming,
must be
Wyoming
United States registered)

